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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20040638-SC

v.
MARK ANTHONY OTT,
Defendant/Appellant.

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEE
The Court has requested supplemental briefing on whether defendant's Alford plea
to aggravated murder "is defective as a matter of law." The specific question posed by the
Court is whether defendant's plea "could satisfy the elements of section 76-5-202,"
particularly the requirement that the defendant "knowingly and intentionally kill the victim."
Otherwise stated, the question is whether defendant's plea had a sufficient factual basis on
the intent element for aggravated murder.
As explained below, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the validity of defendant's
guilty plea because there was no timely motion to withdraw it. But even if this Court had
jurisdiction, defendant'sAlfordplea is not defective, because the record contains a sufficient
factual basis showing that defendant faced a significant risk of conviction for aggravated
murder if he had gone to trial. More importantly, the record also shows that defendant

carefully considered and weighed that risk before entering his plea. His plea, therefore, was
entered intelligently and voluntarily.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE VALIDITY
OF DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA BECAUSE DEFENDANT NEVER
MOVED TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA
This Court lacks jurisdiction to review the validity of defendant's Alford plea because
he has not filed a timely motion to withdraw it. The plea withdrawal statute governs the basis
and timing for a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (West 2004).
A guilty plea "may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a showing that it was not
knowingly and voluntarily made." Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6(2)(a). A request to withdraw
a guilty plea must "be made by motion before sentence is announced." Utah Code Ann. §
77-13-6(2)(b). "Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified in
[the statute] shall be pursued under Title 78, Chapter 35a, Post-Conviction Remedies Act,
and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(c).
This Court has repeatedly held that this statutory deadline for moving to withdraw a
guilty plea is jurisdictional; thus, the failure to file a timely motion to withdraw deprives both
the trial court and the appellate court ofjurisdiction to review the validity of the plea. State
v. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, ffif 10-14, 167 P.3d 1046; Grimmett v. State, 2007 UT 11, % 25,
152 P.3d 306; State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34,ffi[13-20,114 P.3d 585; State v. Reyes, 2002 UT
13, If 3, 40 P.3d 630. See also State v. Mullins, 2005 UT 43, f 11 n.2, 116 P.3d 374 ("As
2

Merrill makes clear/' untimely motions to withdraw a plea "deprive[] the district court of
jurisdiction to entertain those motions"); State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993,995 (Utah 1993) (per
curiam) (under former version of plea statute, right to withdraw plea "extinguished" once
time limit passed). In addition, this Court has applied section § 77-13-6(2)(c) according to
its terms, holding that a defendant who misses the statutory deadline may challenge the
validity of a guilty plea only by filing a petition under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act and
rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. State v. Nicholls, 2006 UT 76,ffl[6-7, 148 P.3d
990.
Defendant was well aware of this jurisdictional deadline. The trial court told him of
it at the change of plea hearing: "Any motion to withdraw your plea must be in writing and
filed prior to imposition of your sentence." R1372:18. Defendant's written plea statement
confirmed that he understood that he would "not be allowed to withdraw [his] plea after
sentencing for any reason." Rl 130. Defendant was also informed that by pleading guilty,
he waived the right to challenge his guilt on appeal and that any appeal would be limited to
challenging his sentence. R1372:18, 26; Rl 127, 1128.
Despite being expressly and repeatedly informed of this jurisdictional deadline,
defendant did not timely move to withdraw his plea. Indeed, he has never claimed to have
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filed a timely motion to withdraw his plea.1 This Court, therefore, lacks jurisdiction to
examine the validity of defendant's plea.
That the Court has sua sponte raised this issue does not change the jurisdictional
analysis. If defendant had raised this issue in his opening brief, this Court clearly would not
have jurisdiction to entertain it. See Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, Iffi 10-14; Merrill, 2005 UT 34,
ffl[ 13-20. If this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a claim when raised by a defendant, it
surely lacks jurisdiction to entertain a claim when a defendant has chosen not to raise it. To
conclude otherwise would lead to "similarly situated" defendants being "treated differently."
Anderson v. Provo City Corp,, 2005 UT 5,118,108 P.3d 701 (citing Utah Const, art. I, § 24
("All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation")).
In sum, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the validity of defendant's guilty plea
for the first time on appeal. If defendant believes his plea is constitutionally defective and
wants to be relieved from its consequences, he has the same avenue for relief as every other
defendant who did not file a timely motion to withdraw—a post-conviction petition. See
Grimmett, 2007 UT 11,fflf25-26 (no appellate jurisdiction to consider validity of plea first
time on appeal, but defendant could seek relief through post-conviction); Nicholls, 2006 UT
!

Over two weeks after sentencing, defendant wrote to the trial court that he had
been trying, without success, "to communicate with my attorney with the desire to
withdraw my mistaken plea and to appeal." R1299. The letter was accompanied by a
hand-written notice of appeal and request for appointment of appellate counsel. Id.
Nothing in the letter suggested that defendant intended it to be a motion to withdraw his
plea and the trial court did not treat it as such. Significantly, defendant did not claim in
his opening or reply briefs that he had an unresolved motion to withdraw his plea. But
even if the letter could reasonably be construed as a motion to withdraw, it was untimely
and therefore incapable of conferring jurisdiction on this Court.
4

76, fflf 6-7 (no appellate jurisdiction to consider validity of plea absent timely motion to
withdraw; Post-Conviction Remedies Act "only[] avenue for relief now available to
Defendant").
POINT II
EVEN IF THE COURT HAD JURISDICTION, DEFENDANT'S
ALFORD PLEA IS SUPPORTED BY A SUFFICIENT FACTUAL BASIS
THAT DEFENDANT FACED A SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF
CONVICTION IF HE HAD GONE TO TRIAL; DEFENDANT
CAREFULLY WEIGHED THAT RISK BEFORE ENTERING HIS
PLEA
This Court lacks jurisdiction, but defendant's Alford plea was not defective in any
event. First, the record reflects a sufficient factual basis that, on the legal theory adopted by
the trial court, defendant faced a substantial risk of conviction for aggravated murder if he
had gone to trial. Second, the record shows that defendant carefully weighed that risk and
that he, therefore, intelligently and voluntarily entered his Alford plea.
A.

A sufficient factual basis supports the intent element of defendant's Alford plea
to aggravated murder.
1.

A sufficient factual basis supports an Alford plea if the prosecution has
sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction.

While defendant entered ordinary guilty pleas to attempted aggravated murder,
aggravated arson, and aggravated assault, he entered an Alford plea to aggravated murder to
avoid risking a death sentence. An Alford plea is one in which the defendant maintains his
innocence, but, in order to avoid the risk of a harsher penalty, pleads guilty based on a
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concession that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to prove guilt. See North Carolina
v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
Before a trial court may accept a guilty plea, it must first find that 'there is a factual
basis for the plea." Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(B). See also State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d
440,443 (Utah 1983); Willett v. Barnes, 842 P.2d 860, 861 (Utah 1992). In a regular guilty
plea, a "factual basis is sufficient if it establishes that the charged crime was actually
committed by the defendant." Utah R. Crim. P. 11 (e)(4)(B). But in an Alford plea, a factual
basis is sufficient if it establishes "that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish
a substantial risk of conviction." Id. See also Willett, 842 P.2d at 862 (factual basis mAlford
plea must "establish[] facts that would place the defendant at risk of conviction should the
matter proceed to trial").
Utah courts examine the record as a whole to determine whether a sufficient factual
basis exists. See Willett, 842 P.2d at 861-63; see also State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266,
1273 (Utah 1988); State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 671,674 (Utah App. 1993). The "record
as a whole need not be conclusive or uncontroverted on the question of guilt"; however,
"'there must be evidence from which a court could reasonably find that the defendant was
guilty—a factual basis for the plea.'" Stilling, 856 P.2d at 674 (quoting United States v.
Owen, 858F.2d 1514,1517 (11th Cir. 1988)).

6

2.

The record here shows that the prosecution had sufficient evidence to
establish a substantial risk of conviction for aggravated murder.

As the Court noted in its order for supplemental briefing, to convict defendant of
aggravated murder, the State had to prove that defendant intentionally or knowingly caused
the death of another—in this case, Lacey Lawrence—and that he did so under one of the
statutorily-enumerated aggravators—in this case, while committing an aggravated arson.
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (West 2004). Because it is undisputed that defendant caused
the death of Lacey Lawrence while committing aggravated arson, the only question is
whether there was a factual basis that defendant intentionally or knowingly caused her death.
The trial court properly found a sufficient factual basis on defendant's mental state when it
denied defendant's motion to quash the bindover.
At the preliminary hearing, the prosecution adduced evidence that at about 2:13 a.m.
on September 1, 2002, defendant purchased Coleman fuel, a BIC lighter, and a knife from
a grocery store near his wife's home. Rl381:84-89. About 15 minutes later, defendant,
armed with his purchases, cut the phone lines to his wife's home, broke down the back door,
and repeatedly stabbed Allen Lawrence, who was in the master bedroom. R1381:109-14,
149, 161-63, 182, 256. Defendant also stabbed his stepdaughter Sarah when she tried to
intervene. Rl381:182-83. After leaving a bleeding and seriously-injured Lawrence by the
front door, defendant, who had lost his fuel in the melee, retrieved gasoline from the garage.
R138L115, 140, 163, 234-35. Defendant then poured gasoline on a couch and loveseat
located near thefrontdoor, down the hall, and on the master bed. Rl 3 81:115-16,121,221,
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226. After lighting the couch and loveseat on fire, defendant fled the burning house in his
wife's car. R1381:117,221, 225,244.
Allen Lawrence was no longer in the front room when defendant returned with the
gasoline. He and Sarah had escaped through thefrontdoor.2 R1381:l 15,143,183-84. But
defendant's wife, Donna Ott, her daughter Lucy, Lucy'sfriendHillary, and Lawrence's sixyear-old daughter Lacey were still in the home. Rl381:115-17,184. The evidence showed
that although defendant did not know that Lacey was in the home when he lit the fire, he
knew that others, including his wife and Lucy, were still in the home. R1381:l 16-17, 146
(defendant looked at Donna while he lit the loveseat); R1381:143 (Lucy came upstairs and
screamed, prompting defendant to release her mother before retrieving the gasoline).
The evidence also showed that defendant knew the layout of the house, that Donna
lived there with her four children, that defendant's two stepdaughters slept in the basement,
and that it was not unusual for his stepdaughters to havefriendssleep over, particularly on
a holiday weekend. R1381:15-16, 22, 108, 125-26, 190; R1382:283. Despite this
knowledge, defendant did not go downstairs to make sure that both his stepdaughters were
out of the house when he lit the fire. Rl 3 82:283. Defendant did not have to worry about his
two young children, however, because he knew that they were visiting his parents for the
weekend. R138L21, 50-51,107.

2

It is not clear from the record whether defendant knew that Lawrence and Sarah
had left the house. &*>R1381:183-84, 193.
8

In closing argument, the State relied on the doctrine of transferred intent to argue that
defendant intentionally or knowingly caused Lacey's death. Rl382:292. The prosecutor
began with Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-204:
In any prosecution for criminal homicide, evidence that the actor caused the
death of a person other than the intended victim shall not constitute a defense
for any purpose to criminal homicide.
The prosecutor argued that defendant intended to kill Allen Lawrence and that during the
same criminal episode he caused Lacey's death. Rl382:295. The prosecutor argued that
defendant moved continuously from stabbing Lawrence to setting the house on fire, knowing
that there were other people in the house, thereby creating a "kill zone." Id. The prosecutor
argued that transferred intent applies when a defendant, intending to kill someone, creates
a kill zone that endangers others, thereby causing the death of someone other than the
intended victim. R1382:299.
The magistrate agreed that transferred intent was an appropriate legal theory in this
case. R1382:312-13. In finding probable cause, the magistrate noted that defendant went
to the home intending to forcibly enter it, kill Lawrence, and bum the premises. R1382:315.
But the magistrate also pointed out that defendant had "set the fire on purpose, knowing that
people were in the home, knowing it was a residence," and "in an area which would
essentially cut off an exit from that home through the traditional doorways once the fire was
started." Id.
Defendant moved to quash the bindover for aggravated murder, arguing that the
preliminary hearing evidence was insufficient to show that he had intentionally or knowingly
9

caused Lacey's death. Rl 62-66,171-75. Defendant essentially argued that the transferred
intent theory did not apply to his case because his conduct in trying to kill Lawrence was by
stabbing and his conduct in killing Lacey was by starting the fire. Rl66-68, 174.
The trial court denied the motion to quash. The trial court agreed with defendant that
the transferred intent theory did not apply to his conduct in trying to kill Lawrence by
stabbing. R383. The trial court reasoned that applying a defendant's mental state when he
engaged in one type of conduct to an outcome resultingfroma different type of conduct was
"simply too tenuous a theory to justify binding a defendant over on a capital offense." Id.
But the trial court concluded that transferred intent nonetheless applied because, as
the magistrate found, the preliminary hearing evidence showed that defendant purposely set
the fire in a place that cut off a likely escape route, knowing that people were in the home.
Id. The trial court reasoned that a trier of fact could reasonably infer that "a person who
purposely starts a fire in a home that he knows to be occupied does so with the intent to cause
the death of the occupants." Id. Thus, a fact finder could reasonably infer that when
defendant set the fire, he intended to kill Donna, but instead caused the death of Lacey. Id.
The trial court concluded that whether this was in fact defendant's intent when he set the fire
was a jury question. Id.
After unsuccessfully seeking interlocutory reviewfromthis Court on that issue, R436,
921, defendant entered his Alfordplea, Rl 121-29. During the plea hearing, the trial court
ascertained that defendant understood that the elements of aggravated murder included an
intentional or knowing mental state and that defendant and his attorneys believed that the
10

State's evidence presented a substantial risk that he would be convicted. R1372:10,13-14;
see also Rl 123-25.
Defendant's written plea statement and the prosecutor presented several stipulated
facts as providing a basis for the trial court to accept the plea and for the State to prove the
elements of aggravated murder. Rl 123-25. Those facts included the basic facts presented
at the preliminary hearing, including that in the wee hours of the morning on September 1,
2002, defendant "purchased a large knife, a package of cigarette lighters, and a one gallon
container of Coleman fuel"; that defendant immediately took his newly-purchased items to
his wife's home, knowing that it was "occupied that morning by [his] estranged wife, Donna
Ott; [his] stepchildren, Sarah and Lucy Gooch; and Allen Lawrence"; that defendant
repeatedly stabbed Lawrence with the intent to kill him; that defendant stabbed his
stepdaughter Sarah when she tried to intervene; that "[s]ome time during the course of the
attack [defendant] left Allen Lawrence seriously injured in the living room area of the
residence by the front entrance door" to retrieve gasoline from the garage; that defendant
poured gasoline "around in the house beginning on a love seat by the front door and down
the hallway into the master bedroom and also on the bed"; that defendant set the fire with the
lighter he had just purchased; and that "[a]t the time [he] set the fire there were still people
in the residence." Rl 125.
Those facts, viewed in light of the entire record, showed that the prosecution had
sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction. As the trial court noted in
denying the motion to quash the bindover, a jury could reasonably find that a person who
11

purposely sets a fire in an occupied home intends to kill the occupants. This finding is
bolstered when, as here, the arsonist attacks when he knows the occupants are likely to be
sleeping, cuts the phone lines to prevent the occupants from summoning help, and sets the
fire so as to cut off a primary escape route. That defendant intended to kill the occupants by
fire in this case was also supported by the fact that he attacked when he knew that his own
children were out of harm's way.
Defendant's claim that he did not know that Lacey was present in the home is not a
defense to her murder under the foregoing facts and their reasonable inferences. As stated,
"evidence that the actor caused the death of a person other than the intended victim shall not
constitute a defense for any purpose to criminal homicide." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-204.
In sum, the record facts established a factual basis that the State had sufficient
evidence to present a substantial risk of conviction if defendant had chosen to go to trial.
B.

The record shows that defendant intelligently and voluntarily entered his Alford
plea.
This Court should also refrain from disturbing defendant's plea where the record

shows that defendant entered it intelligently and voluntarily and only after carefully
weighing the risk of a death sentence if he went to trial.
As stated, defendant disputed from the beginning that the State could show that he
intentionally or knowingly killed Lacey. He challenged the State's legal and factual theory
on the requisite mental state in his closing argument at the preliminary hearing, R1382:30709, and in his motion to quash the bindover, R159-75. When the trial court rejected his legal
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and factual arguments in the motion to quash the bindover, defendant sought interlocutory
review on the issuefromthis Court. R436. This Court denied the petition. R921.
Thus, defendant was well aware of this issue and fully litigated it in the trial court.
But once this Court denied the petition for interlocutory review, defendant was bound by the
trial court's legal ruling that the State could rely on a theory of transferred intent to show that
he intentionally or knowingly caused Lacey's death. Thus, he was faced with two options.
One, he could risk a conviction and death sentence should the jury believe he intended to kill
the known occupants of the house when he set the fire. If defendant chose this option and
was convicted and sentenced to death, he could still try to convince this Court on direct
appeal either that the doctrine of transferred intent did not apply to him or that the facts
ultimately presented at trial were insufficient to show that he intended to kill the known
occupants of the house. But if this Court did not agree with him, defendant would be stuck
with a death sentence.
Two, defendant could choose to avoid any risk of the death penalty by doing what he
did here—entering a plea in exchange for death being taken off the table. This was the only
option that could guarantee that defendant would not be subjected to a death sentence.
By entering an unconditional plea to aggravated murder, defendant intentionally
abandoned his prior legal and factual claim that he did not intentionally or knowingly cause
Lacey's death. He did so "to avoid the potential of being sentenced to the death penalty."
Rl 128 (written plea statement). Given the factual record in this case, that decision was a
reasonable one. See Alford, 400 U.S. at 37. On the one hand, defendant faced a serious risk
13

of a death sentence. On the other, he could guarantee that his life would be spared. His plea
also left him with the opportunity to seek further lenity by convincing the jury that he was
worthy of the opportunity to some day be paroled. Under the circumstances, it is clear that
defendant's decision to enter his Alfordplea, was made only after carefully considering and
weighing the risks if he chose to go to trial. His plea was therefore knowing and voluntary.
CONCLUSION
This Court lacks jurisdiction to examine the validity of defendant's Alfordplea. But
even if this Court did have jurisdiction, the plea, which defendant entered intelligently and
voluntarily, had a sufficient factual basis.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this h

day of August, 2008.

MARKL. SHURTLEFF
ATTORNEY GENERAL

AURA B. DUPAIX
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
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